One of the people whose knowledge and understanding of Afghanistan I most respect is a qualified supporter of Canada's current engagement there under the aegis of NATO. His answer to anyone who questions our commitment to what is now a hot war: "Where was Canada after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989? Where was the West when we still had a serious chance to rebuild the country peacefully? Who paid attention before the blowback from outside meddling in the eighties became catastrophic?"
So this isn't a post about Afghanistan. It is a reminder of another place where wrong-headed outside meddling, some of it looking awfully familiar, is setting the stage for blowback that could become catastrophic. The people who live there are already living with catastrophe, but of the kind that usually merits no more than a sidebar squib in most North American newspapers.
Last week the news from Somalia made headlines for a few days when an Islamic militia called the Islamic Courts Union finally took control of Mogadishu after a months-long battle with secular warlords that had killed hundreds by the end of May. That confrontation continues around the capital city and may be spreading; since April I've found the current battles easiest to follow through the almost daily reports in the Guardian and Reuters.
As in Afghanistan, complex reality in Somalia defeats easy generalization. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in the city of Baidoa, is too new, too shaky, too divided itself to return to Mogadishu. The Bush administration, projecting the oversimplifications of the War on Terror on to a maze of variously motivated networks, has upped the ante by helping to create and then by backing an untrustworthy coalition of warlords. A year ago the International Crisis Group produced this overview of the situation, already a crisis then:
... in the rubble-strewn streets of the ruined capital of this state without a government, Mogadishu, al-Qaeda operatives, jihadi extremists, Ethiopian security services and Western-backed counter-terrorism networks are engaged in a shadowy and complex contest waged by intimidation, abduction and assassination. The U.S. has had some success but now risks evoking a backlash ......
Since 2003, Somalia has witnessed the rise of a new, ruthless, independent jihadi network with links to al-Qaeda. Based in lawless Mogadishu and led by a young militia leader trained in Afghanistan, the group announced its existence by murdering four foreign aid workers in the relatively secure territory of Somaliland between October 2003 and April 2004. Western governments, led by the U.S., responded to the threat of terrorism in and from Somalia by building up Somali counter-terrorist networks headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighbouring Puntland. The strategy has netted at least one key al-Qaeda figure, and as many as a dozen members of the new jihadi group are either dead or behind bars.
Despite these successes, counter-terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public. Few Somalis believe there are terrorists in their country, and many regard the American-led war on terrorism as an assault on Islam. Unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment. Without public support, even the most sophisticated counter-terrorism effort is doomed to failure.
...
... the dirty war between terrorists and counter-terrorist operatives in Mogadishu appears to have entered a new and more vicious stage that threatens to push the country further towards jihadism and extremist violence unless its root causes are properly addressed ...
The threat of jihadi terrorism in and from Somalia is real. But attempts by the new Somali leadership and its regional allies to exploit this threat for short-term political gain risk plunging the country into even greater crisis. Several key leaders in the deeply divided transitional government are notorious for smearing adversaries and critics with allegations of terrorist linkages -- conduct that threatens to deepen the schisms within the government.
...
A successful counter-terrorism campaign requires more engagement with the broader public, including civil society organisations and more moderate Islamist groups. Somalis must be persuaded not only that some individuals guilty of terrorism are indeed in their country but also that the counter-terrorism agenda does not involve subjugation by factional or foreign interests. At the same time, Somalia's partners must become involved with the peace process, helping to overcome the TFG schisms and to forge a genuine government of national unity. If they fail to do so, jihadis will gradually find growing purchase among Somalia's despairing and disaffected citizenry, and it will only be a matter of time before another group of militants succeeds in mounting a spectacular terrorist attack against foreign interests in Somalia or against one of its neighbours.
A couple of weeks ago we were chewing over the question of Tony Blair, his motives in risking so much by allying himself so closely with the Bush administration, and the possibility that there might be some substance to the special concern he has intermittently claimed to have for revived internationalist ideals, especially as those might be put to work in Africa.
This Guardian report from late May suggests that the Blair government may indeed have been attempting to mitigate the divisive and destabilizing effects of CIA/Pentagon meddling in Somalia:
The US is increasingly pursuing a proxy war against al-Qaida-backed jihadis that analysts say is turning Somalia into a new front in the "war on terror". Badly burned there in the 1990s, nation-building is not Washington's main concern."The US is treating Somalia primarily as a counter-terrorism issue. That is the prism through which everything there is seen," a source said yesterday. "Britain is taking a broader, more holistic approach. It believes that is the way to stop Somalia being a problem in the longer term. That's why Benn [UK secretary of state for international development and the PM's personal representative to Africa] was there, discussing a wide range of issues."
...
Declining to deny it was supporting the warlords' alliance, the White House said last week that its first priority was preventing Somalia becoming a Horn of Africa "beach-head" for al-Qaida. The US continued to work with "responsible members of the Somali political spectrum", the state department said, without specifying with whom.
But President Yusuf said last month there was no doubt Washington was backing Mr Dhere's factions against Islamist groups - and asked that it work through his government instead. Demonstrators in Mogadishu denounced the warlords as Washington's puppets last week. One banner said: "We don't want people who take dollars to kill us." After a brief ceasefire, fighting has flared anew.
According to the International Crisis Group, the US has got it wrong and spreading Islamist ideas are not Somalia's main problem. "Somalis in general show little interest in jihadi Islamism; most are deeply opposed," it said. A bigger danger was that America, fixated on the spectre of al-Qaida, would exacerbate existing divisions and undermine the transitional leadership.
How late is too late to begin countering a clumsy counter-terrorism campaign that has apparently been run in ignorance and on the cheap?
"The approach - strategy would be too generous a word - was to strengthen [the warlords'] hand in order to try to eliminate the threat posed by these individuals," said Mr Prendergast.In February a group of warlords formed a coalition called Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and accused the courts of harbouring al-Qaida. The courts called the alliance American puppets. US diplomats in Nairobi who criticised the warlord payments as shortsighted were ignored and, in one case, reassigned to another country. The State Department, which favoured a wider policy of nation-building, was trumped by the CIA and the Pentagon, which wanted results fast.
"They didn't realise their limited engagement would actually make matters worse," said Mr Prendergast. "It's ignorance and impecuniousness that have led us to be in a more difficult and disadvantageous position than we were."
Alarmed by Washington's intervention, the militia escalated its operations in recent months, culminating in this week's seizure of the capital.
For the White House it was a humiliating reversal but not necessarily a catastrophe. From their stronghold of Jowhar the warlords are regrouping and talking of retaking Mogadishu. Revenue from smuggling and business interests is likely still to flow, as will weapons from Ethiopia in defiance of an international embargo.
Reuters reports that the TGF has had to impose a curfew in Baidoa, where presidential guards have been fighting off yet a different militia group. Yesterday militiamen in Mogadishu cut power to cinemas to prevent citizens from watching broadcasts of the World Cup. In their longing for peace and order, those same citizens have appeared relieved at the success of the ICU. But a dirty proxy war has so far given them no more than a breather, and little reason to trust any of the strong men in anyone's capital.
The situation in Somalia is finally on the public radar (at least, the same way that the Sudan wars were in 2004.) But this proxy war seems like the dictionary definition of "not learning the lessons of the past century" double-underlined in italics. I am skeptical of the notion that someone can just ride in and save the day with diplomats and good intentions (Still less troops, which at any rate noone will send there.)
I suppose the best one can hope for the West to radically re-think the ethical minimums of involvement and try to jumpstart a multilateral push for peace. Counterterrorism is best pursued by law enforcement in peacetime, not by central fronts and subsidized warlords. If public consciousness of this issue can override the experience of the last Somali intervention, AU or UN peacekeepers might help to cement a (presently non-existent and perhaps far fetched) settlement.
But... The South Sudan war went on how long? The Congo wars with their millions dead? And I'm not convinced that the Darfur or Chad-Sudan conflicts are on the road to resolution either; the UN had peacekeepers in Rwanda before the genocide, 'half-assed involvement' is not decisive.
I’m not quite sure what Afghanistan has to do with your post Skdadl, but I would hazard a guess and say that it was to use the quote as a lead-in. If that’s correct, then it would seem logical to infer that the post argues that Canada should actively engage itself more in international affairs. However, you seem to argue that the meddling, largely by the US and the UK, have made the situation worse in Somalia. From that, it seems that you believe that Canada could do a better job. Is this accurate?
If I understood you correctly, then I would say that you may be right. But Canada has been sleeping in recent years clinging to the Pearson’s legacy. Canada has much to offer the world, but has not picked up much of the tab for global security. Instead, it has preferred indirect channels via the US, which may or may not be unfortunate.
I agree with Jason Townsend in that gallivanting in with diplomats, aid, troops and good intentions does not necessarily solve the problems (especially in the long-term) of other peoples. I even agree that we, Westerners, must consider the minimums required to create lasting solutions.
With that said, such involvement inevitably takes on invasive measures, sometimes compromising sovereignty or constituting interference. And worse yet, sometimes such engagements take on a paternalistic approach – a we know what’s best attitude. There must be some balance. But thus far, such balance has eluded many Western states with good intentions. In the end, though, I do no think that this should deter us from trying to help people. Rather, I think that it, at least partly, explains the hesitation and sometimes slack job on the part of the US and the UK (among numerous other factors, some of which you've mentioned Skdadl).
I would also add that Troops are unfortunately a necessary part of international relations. They act as a deterrent against aggressive states. They implement foreign policy, including foreign aid. And do much more. It’s not like we can lawyer them to death. International law and moral decency do not persuade countries with no conscience.
*sigh*
CdnTarHeel, I thought my reason for mentioning Afghanistan was fairly obvious: from our point of view, blowback. From the pov of the Afghans: CIA meddling helped to create a greater evil than they had ever lived with before, helped to distort their culture.
Forgive me, CTH, but I'm not sure I can think of an instance when a "Western state" has done very much internationally with good intentions. I know that lots of Westerners have good intentions, but in all the major foreign interventions I know, the self-interest of the states who have intervened has seemed pretty transparent to me. I don't care what lying rationalizations they give for their interventions; Western states act in their own interest. There are many troubled places in the world where our states do nothing, and there's a reason for that.
My post was meant to point out that even relatively conservative observers -- and I think that the British government and the ICG may be called that -- have been concerned for some time that CIA/Pentagon meddling in Somalia has been wrong-headed, simplistic, and is likely to make a bad situation worse. Their worries are being borne out.
I don't believe that good foreign policy requires us to keep carrying any white man's burden at all -- quite the contrary. Support for a nation in trouble means precisely what support in real life means: it means you listen; you take direction; you give people on the ground what they know they need; you don't go romping in with your own selfish and inevitably stupid plans. Unless, of course, you happen to be an imperialist, and then, of course, you will never listen to anyone else and will just go on making things worse.
In many countries in the world -- much of Africa, eg, the Middle East, and Central Asia -- local cultures and politics have been severely distorted by several centuries of cynical interventions by the West. Any delusions we might have that we can straighten that out now according to our own lights are to me both laughable and despicable.
If we seriously want to help, then we offer help. In many cases, it may be too late. The war is on, and it is our fault.
Of course, the question is, who do we offer help to? How do the details work of offering help to people when their government or armed factions acting in a pseudo-governmental capacity are uncooperative or outright antagonistic?
What about if the help that is asked of the west is security, as in Afghanistan? A lot of people who are critics of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan are hesitent to consider Hamid Karzai's government legitimate, which would make that 'request for help' conveniently just our patsy asking us to do what we want, but I find that very unconvincing.
I agree with a lot of what you're saying, but I feel like I need to qualify the conclusion; I think it's very rare that 'romping in with one's own plans' will lead to any beneficial result; and yet the same time, there were times in the 1990s where outside involuntary intervention was, in my view, necessary.
One looks at the former Yugoslav situation; there is no way to maintain a hands off approach and still prevent UN safe zone massacres, the failure of UNPROFOR, the siege of Sarajevo, the ethnic cleansing in the countryside, Srebrenica; and then the denouement in Kosovo and the Kosovo war.
Contemporarily, we left General Dallaire and UNAMIR hanging in the breeze as we saw, in slow motion, the Rwandan genocide approaching and happening. And then when we were busy wringing our hands and asking ourselves why we let these things happen,the first and second Congo Wars were spiraling out of control, having started in part because of the chaotic fallout of what happened in Rwanda. Three million deaths and an African world war later, I still mostly hear nothing of that conflict in mainstream political discourse.
Right; I don't mean to go on endlessly with high-horse talk; my point is this: We, citizens who believe in the UNDHR who live in states with the power to reach in and stop crimes from happening, failed. We failed horribly and should have our noses ground in it regularly. There are other types of horrible failure - look at Iraq - but the failures of the 1990s should never be forgotten.
Now, I realize that the huge problems surrounding the use of force in humanitarian interventions are extremely challenging (in a way similar to how intervening without force can be extremely challenging.) But I think we should recognize that a hands off approach is not always moral.
I think that people who are (rightly) incredibly suspicious of the motives of 'interveners' should apply their skepticism to the particulars of flawed interventions rather than conceptually damning armed intervention as an entire category of state behavior, as has become fairly popular. That way we will not be powerless to oppose events like those I mentioned, but we will be more rigourous about the motivations, methods and plans involved.
Should have read "UDHR."
Skdadl,
I’m not sure where to begin. Your response to my comment was loaded (and perhaps, in all fairness, as loaded as my own).
(1) Obvious?: I’m not so sure about that. Out of the entire quote, only one sentence related to blowback, whereas the other sentences related to Canada’s lack of involvement. So, unless the reader latched onto the notion of blowback, then it was not obvious.
(2) Good intentions: You seem to take quite a sinister view of international relations and the intentions of more powerful states. There seems to be an underlying assumption (and correct me if I’m wrong) that a state, which acts in its own best interests, must do so contrary to the interests of other states, namely those that are being interfered with. In many instances, the self-interest of a country goes to the world-view of that country, and consequently, when that country believes that it is assisting others, it is acting in its own self-interest.
(3) Policy in Somalia: I do not think that there is any disagreement about the failures going on in Somalia. Moving-on.
(4) Foreign Aid and Assistance: “White man’s burden”? What? I guess you agree with me that we should not take a we know what’s best attitude.
With that said, I tempered my argument for assisting other countries, because such assistance often takes rather invasive measures. This can be viewed as interference, and can affect a country’s sovereignty.
(5) Blowback and Fault: Blowback refers to the unintended consequences resulting from the implementation of foreign policy. The term does not necessarily take the most ironic scenario, where a state’s foreign policy ends up biting you in the butt. However, such ironic instances make for a better story. And the two types of instances that seem to get the most press are: (1) those in which Country A’s propaganda is fed Country B and later reported as fact in Country A; and (2) Country A sells weapons to Group X and those weapons are later used against Country A in another event.
It seems to be around 9/11 when people started thinking of blowback in the connotation that you appear to be alluding to – Country A assists Group X to fight Country B, and then later, Group X turns against Country A. In this connotation, there is an underlying assumption that Group X turns against Country A, because of something that Country A did. This assumption is not necessarily true. Group X may simply hate both Countries A and B. Or there may be any number of other explanations. There are numerous factors, both anticipated and unforeseen, that play a role. I think that you’re too quick to lay blame, especially when it comes to such a complicated phenomenon as blowback.
Jason Townsend,
I’m confused. I’ll try to summarize what I think you’re saying to make sure that I understand you. We should generally not involve ourselves in other countries and remain to ourselves, unless we know precisely who to help and when:
(1) it is morally wrong to stay out - e.g., Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan etc., and/or
(2) that country asks us for our help.
I don't have a problem with your summary two points, CTH, but my main argument is that we should not rule out armed intervention; I just wish that those advocating it and those always vehemently against it would engage with one another and recognize the validity of each others' criticisms. Isolationism and what has been called 'he-manitarianism' are poles we want to avoid.
Returning to Somalia, I see that the fighting continues to move on in the South and the ICU is making more gains; a google news search brings up several different similar stories about their advances.
I think that people who are (rightly) incredibly suspicious of the motives of 'interveners' should apply their skepticism to the particulars of flawed interventions rather than conceptually damning armed intervention as an entire category of state behavior, as has become fairly popular.
OK then, Jason, as one of the 'skeptical,' I'll say this:
If we're skeptically looking at the particulars of certain interventions, say, like those in the Balkans, should we not ask whether something like the 'credibility of NATO' (Warren Christopher) was worth escalating bombings in Bosnia, or for proceeding with bombing attacks on Serbia (thus exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, btw), as the Clinton team argued a few years later?
For my own part, the answer is 'No,' FWIW.
Furthermore, I think the 'conceptual' category of armed intervention as a form of state behaviour is too abstract to be damned, saved or consigned to Limbo, frankly.
It seems to me that, particularly in the context of post-WW II developments regarding the use of armed force by states, that those state officials proposing the use of military force to solve concrete crises face a very difficult burden of proof to make their case. Frequently, I think, they fail to meet it; often they don't even make a serious try, relying on propaganda to do the heavy lifting for them.
This propaganda and the actions it justifies, moreover, often end up weakening the very international conventions and institutions on which a more just world order depends (in the concrete cases of Iraq, the Balkans, etc.).
In fact, Stephen, I think we agree. We were both very uncomfortable with Clinton's policy on Kosovo, which only by chance ended up working, and we both think that, conceptually, one cannot either "support or oppose" armed force without reference to the specific context - which is to say, universal crusading militarism and universal pacifism both run into serious moral/ethical trouble in the context of what goes on in the contemporary world.
I agree with you on your last point about weakening the international order via Iraq and its propaganda/justification; in the Balkans, I think we have to be more careful in our conclusions. The Kosovo war I had real issues with, with the lurid pre-war sensationalist war fever in the media, and with the way that the war was carried out.
And yet, do I think that we just needed to stick with UNPROFOR style 1990s internationalism? I will take a very hearty pass on that.
Let me be stereotypically Liberal here: cut the gordion knot if necessary, but don't necessarily cut the gordion knot. And be very aware of the heavy moral, legal, and security costs of doing it, especially if it means bypassing the UN and thus undermining its legitimacy, one's own legitimacy, and long term security.
You, and some others, might take a huge double take and say, whoah, cut the gordion knot? Is he talking about sidestepping the UN? To which I'd simply ask, what do you do in 1995 faced with UNAMIR? I don't ask rhetorically or to knock the UN, which is a tough balancing act and a vital working institution.
In the case of UNAMIR we should have backed up our man the way we could have, with force, period, whatever the word from New York was. Then we could have sought to earnestly and humbly re-involve the UN when we had fufilled our first duty - our duty to the highest law, the UDHR.
Pardon my stupid date mistake; I was thinking about Bosnian events as well; 1994, not 1995.
I have noticed a pattern in US behaviour with respect to places where they see someone they don't like. The nearly universal policy is:
Find someone violent and pay that someone to kill the people we don't like.
This nearly always results in more violence in the country in question. I mean, duh!
Sometimes it successfully gets rid of the people they don't like. Sometimes it results in the violent people they were paying taking over the country in question. Sometimes those violent people stay bought and behave as US clients (while continuing to do violent things to the local citizens). This result is what US foreign policy would define as a "success". Of course even in the most effective case, the new dictatorship is usually unstable, eventually collapses under pressure from the public, spearheaded by some group the US doesn't like, and they have to do it all over again. This spin cycle has the useful effect for the US of making sure the country never develops to any great degree, thus not gaining the potential to threaten US supremacy.
Other times, it does not successfully kill the people they don't like--perhaps because those people are actually too marginal a presence to readily find and kill any of them. And usually it does kill a bunch of other people; the resentment created may well result in many people deciding that if the US doesn't like group X they must have a point after all.
Somalia is in, what, the second cycle of this? After all, the reason Somalia is in this chaos in the first place is that a US-sponsored dictator ruled for a long time, gutted the country, and then died leaving a power vacuum and no institutions. The dictator was there because the US and Europeans arranged for a brief democracy they didn't like to be undermined and its leaders killed. Hopefully this time around the resentment among the public will be great enough that a backlash will successfully get rid of the US stooges and some kind of stable government may emerge despite US efforts.
On the discussion of isolationism vs. "he-manitarianism" vs. hypothetical ideal thoughtful involvement. I dunno--every time I hear about a new case, I get more negative about intervention. In a way it's not so much that positive intervention wouldn't be possible, or that there aren't cases where intervention didn't happen but would have been positive if it did. It's just that until nation-states are run and constituted very differently from how they are run right now, those are not the interventions that will happen. The interventions that will happen, in nearly every case, will be precisely the ones where the intervenors seek to profit by somehow taking something the locals would otherwise have and/or controlling a region the locals would otherwise control. Such interventions almost inevitably create resistance and violence; even if they don't, by succeeding they create immiseration.
Take Rwanda. People often talk about Rwanda as an example of an intervention we should have done. Maybe. But we wouldn't have, would we? There were really no circumstances short of a major oil discovery that would have caused anyone to intervene in Rwanda, and even in that case the intervention would have taken the form of securing the oil fields and then waiting to reassert control over the rest of the country until after the genocide had burnt itself out anyway.
The only exception I can think of off the top of my head in terms of peacekeeping would be Cyprus. That is, an intervention in a territorial dispute between two more-or-less first-world nations both on the same "side" in broader geopolitical terms. Intervention there worked because during the cold war it was actually in US etc. self-interest to keep the situation between two allies stable, independent of any other payoff. This kind of situation is rare and not very relevant to the typical case.
As a general policy, given the plausible scope for real-world interventions, I lean more and more towards a general policy of isolationism plus foreign aid largely directed through selected NGOs, unless and until the revolution comes and interventions not primarily for capitalist/imperialist purposes become plausible. Any time someone says "isolationism" it's a bad word used to smear the opponents of intervention, but I'm increasingly willing to take it as a badge.
I understand and respect your reservations, PLG. I don't live in intervention cloud-cuckou-land where a situation like Rwanda is instantly resolved with the panacea of troops that are suddenly forthcoming from virtuous first world states with disinterested motives.
But morally, can we wait until, as you say, nation states are constituted very differently than they are now? Until, presumably, they are better than Canada is now? I think unfortunately that that's the same as waiting indefinately and in the meantime adopting a wholly hands-off approach.
And it isn't for me. When I disagree with isolation and (total) pacifism, I'm not trying to tar a viewpoint, or make some macho point, or anything like that. It's a difficult and uncomfortable subject. But I think isolation would carry a lot of extreme practical evils (and would fit the interests of unethical capital quite well in different ways anyway.)
I do also disagree to the extent about the nature of international affairs and the (in my view) somewhat economically deterministic viewpoint of some of what you're saying. I appreciate how vividly reinforced that interpretation has been for many people by the events since 2001, but I always have favoured a more multi-faceted model of how nations behave and interact, and I don't believe that intervention in Rwanda was impossible without it being to guard oil wells.
Wow, PLG. That was quite possibly the worst assessment of American foreign policy that I have ever read. It made huge generalizations about American intentions and tactics, and with the exception of the brief mention of Somali dictators, it was completely devoid of historical context and political reality. Give me a break. What is this spewing of anti-American BS?
I have noticed a pattern in US behaviour with respect to places where they see someone they don't like. The nearly universal policy is: Find someone violent and pay that someone to kill the people we don't like.
Your argument is merely a cynical mosaic of snipes and innuendos at American foreign policy. I’m all for criticism, but this is anything but. (1) Of course countries act out of their own self-interest. And acting to shape the world to your own world-view IS acting in your own self-interest, even if it is out of what you believe are benevolent intentions – human rights included. Basically, you make no distinction of the differing forms of self interest – economic, strategic or “bettering the world in your own world-view”. (2) The mention of “oil” as part of a country’s self-interest is completely argumentative and serves no real purpose except to IMPLY exploitation. (3) The dismissal of Cyprus indicates your wanting to have it both ways. In one instance, you refer to the gross failures of American foreign policy without any mention of historical context (such as the dictators comment), and then in the next moment, you use historical context to dismiss the Cyprus example. This is inconsistent at best. (4) If you’re against intervention, then I wonder if you’re someone who also criticizes the U.S. for not getting involved – especially in Africa. Can the U.S. ever do anything right in your eyes? [rhetorical question]. (5) If no one intervenes, who will take up the tab for global security? Neither Canada nor Europe have the capabilities or the will as or now.
Anyway, I’ll stop ranting.
My dear fellow, I would have thought it was sufficiently obvious not to need overmuch elaboration. And I didn't want to take up pages. But you'd like chapter and verse sufficient to point to a pattern?
Iran, 1950s, gave aid to Shah to topple Mossadegh and kill supporters of democracy and leftists.
Cuba, Bay of Pigs, paid violent expats to attack, ongoing, paid terrorists such as Posada Carriles to bomb and murder.
El Salvador, gave aid to rightist government to slaughter leftists and pro-democracy people.
Nicaragua, hired mercenaries to murder and destroy because they didn't like the leftist government.
9/11 1973, Chile, paid Pinochet to kill Salvador Allende and other socialists.
Afghanistan, eighties, paid various groups to fight Soviet-backed and then Soviet regime.
Guatemala, Argentina and similar dirty wars across Latin America, backed various violent groups to kill and torture leftists, democrats, union members etc.
Colombia today, paying government billions to kill leftists, peasants, union leaders and so forth.
Venezuela, paid violent groups to destabilize, are still paying those groups--we will see if they manage to produce much violence.
Haiti, didn't like Aristide and his centrist policies, paid and armed violent coupsters; this is at least the third time round for such actions in Haiti.
Iraq, paid Saddam to attack Iran.
Indonesia, paid/helped Suharto to overthrow government, kill hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists and whoever else might be in the way. Provided massive lists of names.
Counting Somalia itself (twice), that's somewhere in the neighbourhood of sixteen cases of the behaviour in question, just off the top of my head. I hesitate to think how many haven't occurred to me. Not to mention the less-successful ones that will have gone under the radar, so to speak. I'd say that's enough to indicate a trend.
As to some of your questions, let's see--
On your (1)--This is unrelated to my point. Finding and helping thugs to kill people is a *tactic*; it could be used to achieve many possible objectives, depending on just who you are having killed and why. It is a tactic the US is addicted to no matter what their stated objectives at the time may be. It is admittedly a tactic not very well fitted to benevolent objectives; whenever I see benevolent claims made alongside the use of that tactic, I find myself doubting.
On your (2)--I wasn't *IMPLYING* exploitation. I was saying flat out that the dominant countries will not and do not intervene except when it gives them an opportunity to exploit.
On your (3)--First, to the contrary I was referring in many cases to US foreign policy *successes*. Just successes at accomplishing evil objectives. And the contexts for most of these interventions have been very simple--groups or governments having politics the US disagreed with, either overly nationalist or overly redistributive or both. That is, the existence of people the US didn't like. And their response has been simple--get someone to kill those people. Or sometimes do the job themselves. The only real exceptions have been in the first world where the tactic is less feasible, or when they were too busy elsewhere. It is the standard tactic anywhere the locals can be pushed around. I don't see how I can qualify that by discussing particular local/political/historical circumstances, it happens too frequently. If anything, the point is that the US does not worry much about particular historical circumstances, it just applies its usual technique.
With respect to your (4)==Nice straw being. No, I have never criticized the US for not getting involved. Can they ever do anything right? In foreign policy, especially where either the military or intelligence agencies are involved, probably not. That's why I'm in favour of them doing as little as possible. Us too, certainly nowadays--the only reason we do less evil is that we do less.
With respect to your (5)--It is to laugh. The US creates far more global INsecurity than it ever created of security. If they stopped "picking up the tab", then they would stop creating both kinds. On balance, we'd be overwhelmingly better off.
Yikes, PLG.
I wonder if you see how your drastic oversimplification of the events in your laundry list might present a dubious, if not unsupportable, line of reasoning: Iran, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Chile, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Haiti, Iraq, Indonesia, etc.. You managed to leave out complete swaths of history, strategy and context, mainly during the Cold War. As one example, you managed to leave out the fact that Carter’s hesitance exacerbated the problem in Nicaragua. As it was becoming clear that the official leader was in fact a dictator, the US continued to support the country in terms of weapons and money. Carter continued with the status quo of aiding the standing government, instead of cutting ties. We can argue back and forth over historical details, but I hope that I’ve illustrated your disregard for context. And context is everything.
Moreover, you’ve cherry picked the events in your laundry list (which you believe support your claim) without any mention of other events that might suggest something altogether different. Even if I were to agree with your incredibly deficient historical analysis, I would have no choice but to look at your remarks with skepticism. They are devoid of any sense of balance. Instead of trying to ascertain a truth, you simply use hyperbole, oversimplification and generalization to argue an anti-American agenda.
What’s most troubling is your negative preoccupation and knee-jerk reaction with respect to American foreign policy. A brief review of your responses to my points demonstrates the anti-American sentiment that oozes throughout your comments.
(1) Your response does not address my point. Instead, it walks around it. You try to connote a devious, even sinister, tone to the word “tactic” in an effort to escape the previous lack of differentiation among objectives when it comes to self-interest.
(2) I was saying flat out that the dominant countries will not and do not intervene except when it gives them an opportunity to exploit. I would hope that this comment should speak for itself. But I wonder if I need to unpack the underlying assumptions in your comment. Do I?
(3) I was referring in many cases to US foreign policy *successes*. Just successes at accomplishing evil objectives. This one too – I shouldn’t even have to address this anti-American blah.
(4) Straw-man (straw being)? I made no claim, no staw man. I posed a question to see if you would defy it. And you did not. At least your belief in non-intervention is consistent, even if nothing else is.
(5) The US creates far more global INsecurity than it ever created of security. And I would hope that no one would actually be expected to address this.
I guess that some people no longer feel the need to justify their anti-American sentiments and conclusions - a simple accusation is apparently enough. Anti-American arguments, such as yours, simply rely on the anti-American labels, imagery etc. to make their point.
For someone oh-so-insistent that I justify at length and in detail, you haven't done a whole lot of your own. You just label my points anti-American and leave it at that. Oh, and complain that you shouldn't have to respond at all. Well, gee, you don't in fact have to--and if you have no response, as you seem not to, perhaps you shouldn't bother.
*warning: scolding follows*
That was quite possibly the worst assessment of American foreign policy that I have ever read.
Not that I doubt that Purple Library Guy can take care of himself, but CdnTarHeel, I have to ask you to stop with broadsides like that one against your fellow commentators here, and also to watch labelling other commentators here. Specifically, no charging anyone with being "anti-American" when he is simply analysing a history of state behaviour towards other nations.
*/scolding*
PLG, I might differ with you on one conclusion you're drawing above ... maybe. If we could trust Canadian mandarins to be thinking seriously about an independent foreign policy, there have been and are crisis situations -- some undoubtedly caused by imperialist actions in the past -- where, instead of being "isolationist," we could be actively promoting some multilateral resistance to American policies and actions.
The Brits sometimes seem to claim that they are trying to do that in Africa. I don't know how seriously to take that claim from the current regime, but I'm sure there is strong support for such a stance in Britain. I am semi-suspicious of the other Europeans as well, given past and present mercenary interests in troubled lands, but the same opportunities to encourage progressive resistance, at least, are there.
Or maybe this is just wishful thinking.
One question, to Stephen or PLG or anyone else who knows: does anyone here know much about the International Crisis Group? I got quite interested in their site, although I can see that they are overseen by moderately conservative mandarins (like Chris Patten).
PLG
You make an outrageous and unsubstantiated claim about American foreign policy, and I criticize it. You then try to turn it around on me, as if I’m making the claim. Moreover, it seems odd to dismiss my critique, which calls for more context, because to provide any would apparently require a great deal of detail. Yet, I managed to give some context to the Nicaragua example in only three relatively short sentences.
I shouldn’t have to respond to the following precisely because it is unsubstantiated accusation:
(2) I was saying flat out that the dominant countries will not and do not intervene except when it gives them an opportunity to exploit.
(3) I was referring in many cases to US foreign policy *successes*. Just successes at accomplishing evil objectives.
(5) The US creates far more global INsecurity than it ever created of security.
The fact that these claims are unsubstantiated is the main point of the criticism. Why should someone be expected to prove that a claim is unsubstantiated?
skdadl
Mr. PLG’s comments actually meet the definition of the disputed label.
However, you are quite right. I should measure my words more carefully.
Mr. PLG’s comments actually meet the definition of the disputed label.
According to that definition, there are a large number of Americans who are anti-American. I know some of them personally and they're good company to be in.
Correct.
Pogge,
Since my brief quip, "correct" isn't really helpful, here is a good write-up on "the disputed label". Although I'm leary of relying too much on Wikipedia, it does give a more nuanced analysis of the term.
As I state above, skdadl is right. If only out of respect, I should measure my words more carefully due to the connotations that the word has taken on these days.
due to the connotations that the word has taken on these days
Or the lack of them. The way I see the charge used these days, it's just another right wing talking point. If you're looking for a way to change the subject, you run down the list of standard rhetorical clubs to be used to beat your opponent with. If "anti-American" comes closest, you run with it. But it doesn't really mean anything any more except what the user wants it to mean. There's a Humpty Dumpty joke in there somewhere.
Pogge,
I think this is the relevant passage in the Wikipedia write-up:
Contemporary usage is often controversial. The term itself does not imply a critical attitude based on rational objections but rather a prejudiced system of thought and it is therefore rarely employed as a self-identifier (i.e. "I am anti-American...") as this implies bias. Instead, it is often used as a pejorative by those who object to another individual or group's stance toward the United States or its policies.
However, the "disputed label" can take on much more, as the write-up indicates. So, you're right. The term "anti-American" is often incorrectly used as if it can automatically dismiss another point of view.
As I have already received a warning from skdadl, I hesitate in harping on the subject. With that said, when a point of view is hostile (or opposed) to American foreing policy, for example, then it is anti-American. The problem (and indeed, the negative aspect of the term) arises when such a point of view is irrational.
Opposing American foreign policy or any particular American administration and its policies is not anti-American.
As long as people can make humane distinctions between the American people and power structures controlled by an oligarchy, then they are not anti-American.
Website of ICG
Wiki article
The other co-chair is a VP of Boeing; however, the groups intentions appear to be fairly earnest.
Skdadl,
Opposing American foreign policy or any particular American administration and its policies is not anti-American.
I guess you didn't read the definitions or simply didn't like any of them - M-W definition, Webster's definition or Princeton's definition.
And maybe you don't even like Wiki's definition, which incorporates the term's negative connotations.
Do you have an alternative proposal?
Well, since I in fact also made the claim that the only reason Canadian foreign policy does less evil than American foreign policy is that it does less, period I suppose that makes me anti-Canadian. And since I in fact generalized the implausibility of positive intervention to first-world and/or powerful countries generally, that presumably makes me anti-British, anti-French, anti-German, anti-Russian etc. etc.
Amazingly, none of the Canadians on the board have assumed my stance implies a hatred for all things Canadian.
The fact is that in most countries, foreign policy is defined in its objectives and methods by elites who generally subscribe, explicitly or tacitly, to "realist" political theories or offshoots of same, who self-select for positions defining foreign policy based in part on either jingoism, personal greed, or both, and who usually have connections with significant interests narrower than the national one--class and/or commercial interests. In the United States in specific there are many examples of the latter impacting or driving foreign policy, from Halliburton to United Fruit.
"Realist" theory tends to treat state interactions as basically a zero-sum game. There are some acknowledgments that edge cases may not be, but fundamentally that's taken as the general nature of the game. Given these features of foreign policy elites and the nature of "Realist" theorizing about state interactions, anyone who imagines that United States policy has ever been driven significantly by “bettering the world in your own world-view” is being naive in the extreme, especially if they imagine that this might prompt promotion of human rights or democracy that might risk responsiveness to the will of the people. If anything, the US seems to have generally found that the will of the people in foreign countries tends to be inconveniently nationalistic, hampering attempts to make countries act for the interests of the US (or commercial interests in the US) and against the interests of their own people.
Yes, yes, this is all abstract and not pointing to specific instances. Those specific instances are everywhere. I listed many a few points ago. CdnTarHeel made an attempt to counter one of them by claiming that a look at the historical specifics would contradict or alter my thesis about what was done and why; he talked about Nicaragua, claiming:
"Yet, I managed to give some context to the Nicaragua example in only three relatively short sentences."
Ah, yes, the three sentences:
"As one example, you managed to leave out the fact that Carter’s hesitance exacerbated the problem in Nicaragua. As it was becoming clear that the official leader was in fact a dictator, the US continued to support the country in terms of weapons and money. Carter continued with the status quo of aiding the standing government, instead of cutting ties."
The problem with this is that it's difficult to tell whether it's referring to Carter's approach to the Somoza or Sandinista regime, and it's drastically misleading either way. If it's referring to Carter support for the outgoing Somozas, it had been clear for decades that they were dictators and brutal and kleptocratic ones at that, yet their ties with the US were always very close. Treatment of the Somoza regime then clearly had nothing to do with it "becoming clear" that the leader was a dictator, or with any particular president's hesitance. Carter is widely considered one of the least pro-violence or pro-dictatorship presidents in living memory. If *he* was continuing to fund a brutal dictatorship, it seems unlikely any other president would have done differently. More likely another president would have stepped up aid to the Somozas and perhaps sent in military assistance of some sort.
If it's referring to Carter's initial relative acceptance of the Sandinistas, it's by no means clear that their official leader was a dictator, and it's quite clear given the previous example of the Somozas that whether he was a dictator or not could hardly be a major factor in any of his decision-making about them. And the issue I drew attention to in terms of "paying violent people to kill whoever you don't like" had nothing to do with Carter's aid to the Somozas or limited aid to the Sandinistas, it had to do with Reagan's decision to sponsor mercenaries to terrorize Nicaraguan peasants until they gave in and voted for someone else.
Now, in terms of context one could certainly say that the US had reasons to want to intervene, given that the Cold War was still on and Nicaragua had a leftist government and ties with the USSR and Cuba. In addition, a leftist government was likely to be hostile to US timber and beef interests relative to the previous regime. So the US had foreign policy objectives in Nicaragua.
But the question is, what tactics do US foreign policy makers consider appropriate and typically reach for in attempting to achieve policy goals (such as opening markets for their corporations or arranging for governments not to have ties with the USSR or whatever it happens to be in the particular case)? And the answer very frequently is, "Identify the source of opposition to our agenda (whether leaders, grassroots peasant organizations or whatever) and pay someone to kill them". That was certainly the answer Reagan came up with in terms of Nicaragua.
CdnTarHeel is probably particularly incensed by my reference to "evil". Well, guess what? The United States has intervened violently, directly or indirectly, in an amazing number of places. And in very few of these cases did the foreign policy interests involved actually contain so much as the risk of death for any United States citizens--it was generally a matter of convenience, international influence, or "credibility". In many cases the interventions involved not just killing or having people killed, but doing so to thwart local aspirations to democracy, freedom, and/or prosperity for underclasses.
Having people killed, often en masse, and thwarting positive social aspirations, merely for profit, convenience, international influence, or "credibility" is evil. I think that's pretty straightforward, frankly. Sorry, but it takes a lot of rationalization and careful education before anyone can conclude that killing people for any but the most utterly desperate of reasons is not evil.
Thus the cases I listed and the many others out there are often of successful interventions that meet their goals, but the goals are evil as are the processes accepted for achieving them. My major argument through this thread revolves around evil tactics irrespective of general policy goals--there is a simple tactic the US uses frequently and indeed seems to consider a top implement in its foreign policy toolbox, and that tactic is an evil one. Presented with anyone using evil tactics, however, I tend to lose faith that their goals are positive, and to assume that any claims they may make about positive goals are lies or self-deception or some odd no-man's-land in between.
Sometimes the actual people making the policies are evil, sometimes I would hesitate to say that--f'rinstance, I would have no difficulty describing Dick Cheney as evil, but in Jimmy Carter's case, while his position in the system pushed him into accepting some evil goals and using evil methods to pursue them, I think that mostly the man has good intentions and would prefer to do good.
This could perhaps all be summarized:
Go read some Chomsky. And have fun questioning *his* documentation and historical context!
My first exposure to Chomsky was the film version of Manufacturing Consent. I remember thinking, at 16 or whatever it was, "Wow, this is fascinating." And so I watched the whole thing. And what did I come away with?
An ingrained suspicion of everything Chomsky writes, that has never left me. The man's a polemecist foremost, not an historian or social scientist; he isn't interested in writing the history of American foreign policy so much as he is in validating his political theses about same. It's highly tendentious, however much research and undoubted genius he throws at the subject.
You can write history, or you can write "history-as-moral-philosophy," and while the latter may make for stirring polemics, it isn't something I'd hand to someone to help them catch up on the history of US foreign policy. It does, however, nicely set off the Che poster and collection of Rage Against the Machine albums.
Hi PLG,
To begin, I should note that I had a bit of difficulty in trying to understand the particulars of your rant, so if I’ve misconstrued something, please let me know.
Second, your assessment of realist theory is amiss. The theory relates to chaos and the presumption that state actors are the primary, if not the only, actors in international relations. As a byproduct, this theory is skeptical, if not cynical, about the intentions of state actors. So, I’m understandably confused as to why you would imply that my remark (”bettering the world in our world-view”) is somehow naïve. That remark still remains cynical. It does not possess, however, a necessarily sinister quality to it. Ironically, I borrowed that remark from Robert Kagan (a neoconservative and a realist).
Third, I contested your list of events, because they lacked historical context. And I provided Nicaragua as a single example to demonstrate my point. In turn, you seem to take issue with that brief example. Even if I agreed, your critique of my example does not support your claim about any trends in American foreign policy, which would require more than one example.
In your last comment, you mention Noam Chomsky, which is actually quite appropriately. As you must already know, Chomsky is not without his critics, and, as I believe, with good reason. Just this week two British opinions (The Guardian and The Observer) criticized the man’s latest works. Chomsky is well known for his assessments of history and political intent, which leave much to be desired. He often overreaches by reading too much into something. And he often neglects to mention factors which either do not support his claims or which run counter to them. While, the man is undoubtedly a brilliant linguist, Chomsky’s political works are more about advocating his (extreme) point of view rather than trying to make a fair and balanced assessment. It would be seemingly a mistake to read them as objective historical fact instead of political advocacy.
Fourth, I’m not sure why you believe that I would be “incensed”, especially over the idea of “evil” throughout your comments. My previous criticisms may have been harsh, namely in tone, but they have been proportional to your accusations with respect to American foreign policy and the intentions of the American government. I see no problem with that.
With respect to the rest of that paragraph, I’m not really sure what to make of it. It just seems to be more unsubstantiated claims, without even a single example to illustrate what is meant by them. I do not pretend to know if this is the case, but I fear that any negative preconceptions of the U.S. might lead someone to believe these accusations at face value.
Fifth, in response to: My major argument through this thread revolves around evil tactics irrespective of general policy goals – there is a simple tactic that the US uses frequently and indeed seems to consider a top implement in its foreign policy toolbox, and that tactic is an evil one.
Some questions:
(a) What is the tactic? (Am I to guess, “interference”, “assassination”, “implementation of dictators”, what exactly?)
(b) Who considers it an important tactic? (the American government in general, the State Dept., the CIA, the NSA, individual personalities?)
(c) How is it evil? (If I do not know what the tool is, then how can I know if it’s evil or not?)
The reader shouldn’t have to ask these questions.
Sixth, I do not wish to make apologies for the U.S., but at the same time, I fight against facile assertions of blame. I prefer critics who are actually historians and who are balanced, such as John Lewis Gaddis. I also like reading the opinions of those with whom I often disagree, namely Kagan and Fukuyama, and not simply those who share a similar world-view.
Additionally, it should be worth noting that there are other so-called “leftist” thinkers than the anarchists, the socialists and the Marxists when it comes to international relations. And to pickup on the chaos theory that you mentioned with respect to the “realists”, the other side of the spectrum contains “internationalists” and “idealists”, who oppose folks like Chomsky. Harry’s Place is fully of them.
Seventh, I have obviously struck a nerve with the anti-American remark. I continue to tread softly on the issue and remain cognizant of Skdadl’s previous warning. If I might be allowed some leeway…
“Opposed or hostile to…” (as the definition states) does not equate to “hatred of”. Irrational hate or opposition to something or someone is only one particular manifestation of the connotation to which the Wiki article refers. Obviously opposition to something does not necessitate hate. The two drastically differ in degree.
Again, as I understood Skdadl and Pogge, due to the connotations of the term, anti-American, I should measure my words carefully. Although I have not incorrectly or inappropriately employed the term, I must remain mindful that people can easily mistake the word’s definition and my intent in using it.
Finally, please excuse the length of this comment.
Mr. Townsend: So, you watched a *movie* about Chomsky and your reaction is to be suspicious of everything he *writes*. Deep, dude. Try reading something he *writes* and deciding whether to be suspicious of it.
CdnTarHeel writes:
"What is the tactic?"
So, you've been arguing with me for pages and trashing my assessments left right and centre and you haven't even read for comprehension that which you are trashing? Allow me to quote the very first sentences of my very first post in this thread:
"I have noticed a pattern in US behaviour with respect to places where they see someone they don't like. The nearly universal policy is:
Find someone violent and pay that someone to kill the people we don't like."
That is the tactic I have been discussing for the entire flipping conversation. The one which I defined simply and directly, and paraphrased repeatedly using very similar words as I repeatedly pulled the conversation back from subject drifts to emphasize this simple core point. And you haven't even gone into the same zone as any kind of serious counterclaim. Apparently because my English was too plain for you to understand, or something.
Just to help you out here--a serious counterclaim would be along the lines of "The United States government never or rarely hires/sponsors/rewards violent people to kill other people as a method of conducting foreign policy". And then you'd give evidence that that was the case, presumably involving chapter and verse about how all the cases that people imagine involved such US intervention did not actually involve the US at all, or that the people the US was in contact with who killed people consistently did so against the wishes of US foreign policy makers. So far, I have seen no sign of any such evidence, or even, really, any such claim. You've said a lot of things, many of them inaccurate or misleading, but most of them simply irrelevant or mere content-free snark. Hint: When person A says "X is the case", responding "That's the dumbest thing I ever heard" is *not* a smackdown, it's an admission you have nothing to say. You need to actually say "X is not the case" and ideally even "and this is why". You've shown few signs of even trying--the closest you came was your nonsense about Nicaragua.
PLG,
Unfortunately, your haphazard comments and continual misplaced condescension should have made it clear to me earlier that this debate cannot go too far. In a rather bland rhetorical device, you dismiss my critique of Chomsky under the conveniently false assumption that I have not read anything by the linguist, while painting my comments as if they were some how derived from a fictitious movie.
Moreover, your English has been anything but plain. This sentence only appeared in your first comment, and did not appear in your subsequent remarks ("I have noticed a pattern in US behaviour with respect to places where they see someone they don't like. The nearly universal policy is: Find someone violent and pay that someone to kill the people we don't like."). The reader would have to guess in order to know that this is what you meant in your previous rant. And I don't like to guess.
Furthermore, someone does not need to make a counterclaim in order to critique another’s argument. Making a counterclaim is only one way to criticize a claim. Other tactics might include providing an alternative explanation, and identifying the weaknesses in the other person’s argument. And so on.
Additionally, for some reason you forget that you are the one who made the claim, not me. And you still have not adequately backed it.
Ironically, you suggest that my comments have been inaccurate or misleading, when I believe that it has been quite the opposite. To summarize in your terms: PLG makes claim X. Cdn says that claim X is the craziest thing that he’s read, and that PLG needs to back up claim X. Cdn then goes on to identify the weaknesses in claim X (namely lack of historical context, instructive examples and balance). However, PLG believes that by inaccurately painting Cdn’s comments, by continuing to make further claims (whether about Cdn or the US), and by supposedly showing weaknesses in Cdn’s critique that PLG has actually substantiated claim X. None of these tactics actually substantiate claim X, so much as they distract from it.
Finally, short of quoting passages from Chomsky on your part, I don’t see this debate going much further. Thanks anyway.
Correction: my mistake. In my haste, I did not see that your movie comment was directed at someone else. Please excuse the error.
Glibly dismissive much?
Obviously I've read Chomsky's books, PLG, and articles and reviews besides. He's a writer of significance, whatever my views of him as an 'historian.' I was just relating my first experience with his work (And the film of Manufacturing Consent certainly involves the ideas of the book and the man's lectures even if it is partly a biopic.)
CdnTarHeel:
You questioned my initial thesis (if "questioned" is the right word). So I gave you a non-exhaustive list of places where the US got someone to kill for them, mostly cases where it is quite well-known that the US got people to kill for them. You said something about historical context. Frankly, if my claim is that the US regularly gets people to kill for them, and then I list a bunch of places where they did so, I'm not clear how "historical context" changes whether they did so. If the list is long, indicating that it happened frequently, I don't see how "historical context" changes the fact that it's a technique they use habitually.
Historical context could tell you in each case whether a reasonable person might consider them justified in having arranged violence and death. But that doesn't change the fact of them having done so. If you would like to establish that, while it's true that the US habitually arranges violence and killing to pursue their foreign policy ends, the excellence of those ends makes it all justified, go right ahead and make that argument. That's the argument you could try to make using "historical context". It would not, however, be a refutation of my initial point, so I'd still be scratching my head a bit at your heated insistence that I was talking rubbish.
If you want to actually refute me, you'll need to tell me that cases in which I claim the US arranged for violence (e.g. in my list), they did not actually do so. It would be an effective, impressive refutation if you had history to draw on which showed that they didn't--but if you don't feel the burden is on you to demonstrate anything, at *least* you have to make the claim. For instance, you'd have to say "The US was not involved in Pinochet's coup in Chile and did not encourage the murderousness of his regime", and "The US did not aid Suharto in coming to power in the Philippines, nor did they supply massive lists of purported Communist party members on the understanding that the names on those lists would be killed". You haven't made any claims like that, so I haven't felt called upon to get historically specific; we seem to be arguing along with a tacit agreement that yes, all the cases on my list really do represent cases of US arrangements being made for people to be killed. You've just been saying that "historical context", meaning presumably the universe of facts surrounding the American choice to do this stuff, would somehow nullify my claims. But it wouldn't, because I didn't (initially at any rate) make any claims relating to that universe of facts. I just specified what basic choice they very often made ("Find someone violent and pay that someone to kill the people we don't like"); you have said nothing--nothing at all, whatsoever, to the minutest degree--to indicate that they don't make it, or make it any less often than I've suggested. Not only haven't you argued it, you haven't even asserted it. I can't really reinforce my arguments with specifics when you haven't even touched the generalities.
And "balance"? What on earth do you mean? What would balance be--saying "of course, Britain and France and various other countries have employed this technique as well"? Saying "It must be admitted that there are many countries where as far as I know the US has never tried to get some local group to kill people for them"? Sure, I'll stipulate that.
I think this Monthly Review article sums up this discussion nicely. I agree with the authors: we're speaking of a 'Pox' rather than a 'Pax' Americana.
As its they point out: "“As distinct from other peoples on this earth, most Americans do not recognize—or do not choose to recognize—that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, they are often ignorant of the fact that their government garrisons the globe. They do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent but Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire.”
It can be argued that American imperialism began very early indeed. When what is now a part of Canada refused to become the '14th colony' during the American Revolution, it was promptly invaded!
If that list of bases is an 'empire,' it's a pretty piss-poor one as these things go. I don't much like the whole decontextualized 'longue durée' histories of capital A capital I "American Imperialism," because they tend to, overtly or otherwise, push a Hobson-Lenin imperialist vision.
I don't dispute the US (or Soviet, or British, or French, or occasionally Canadian) involvement in international misdeeds in the last century; I think it would be terrible to avert ones eyes from the lessons they offer. At the same time, "who is in charge and what were their aims and means" is a useful and sometimes challenging question to answer when examining a century-long laundry list of invasions, coups and dirty tricks.
And "government secrecy?" Sometimes. More often I think that "public indifference" is the operative force, now and in the past. Look at the blithe, four-party indifference to Canadian troops moving from ISAF to OEF authority in Afghanistan - everyone knew, the information was public, but noone noticed or, one assumes, cared, until after casualties happened.
As for "American Imperialism c. 1775," well, I suppose that's one way to frame historical events, but one could argue that the British-occupied cities like New York were in some senses analagous to British-occupied Canada. Not identical, but the distinction would have been far less clear to the rebel Americans of the time. Nova Scotia, probably the most similar colony to the 13, saw a small, rural, and abortive pro-US insurrection that was put fairly quickly put down, to give one example.
Jason,
Ah, thread drift rears its lovely head. ;-)
Your rather casual parting reference to a "small, rural, and abortive pro-US insurrection" sent me scurrying to brush up on my Nova Scotia history. (If you can point me to any online resources re: this fascinating historical footnote, I'd be much obliged.) While I'd been vaguely aware that New Englanders (then still under British rule) had captured Louisbourg in 1745, I'd never heard this:
"Between 1759 and 1768, about 8000 New England Planters responded to Governor Charles Lawrence's request for settlers from the New England colonies."
Which perhaps explains why some Nova Scotians were sympathetic to the Revolution. Many must still have had kith & kin stateside. One wonders how they got on with the roughly 16,000 Loyalists who showed up just a decade or so later. It may also explain why my Grandad, when it came time to persue higher musical studies beyond his hometown of Yarmouth, chose to go here in the 'Boston States' as many Maritimers refer them to this day.
This short excursion into Nova Scotian history got more and more interesting: a French-English ping pong ball for most of the 18th century, the British Empire's first self-governing entity, and apparently, Canada's first seperatist province! "A motion passed by the Nova Scotia House of Assembly in 1868 refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Confederation has never been rescinded."
Who knew? But I digress...
I do hate to drift from the original and serious Somali topic, but I fear that ship has sailed; and at any rate, with the new peace deal there is probably room for a new Somali thread in a few days, which I might start over at my place.
Regarding Nova Scotia; indeed. The loyalist/New England Settlers' thread is only one of several major migrations to Nova Scotia, but it's definately one of the more important ones. Halifax was founded relatively late as the old cities of Canada go, in 1749, and it still had its dual characteristics of a colony-of-the-colonies and a garrison town when the revolutionary war broke out. The military presence in Halifax essentially meant that there was no prospect of the Americans taking the province; it was highly vulnerable by sea, and highly defensible by land in a war where only one side had a real navy. But if it came down to origins and preferences, then we might well have gone with family ties and been the 14th colony; dodged a bit of a bullet there.
The Nova Scotian revolutionary episode is usually known as "Eddy's Rebellion" after its leader, Jonathan Eddy. There's a fair bit of information scattered around the net if you google the name, but so far the only think on Wikipedia that I found was this article on its decisive battle. Essentially, a Nova Scotian-American landed and raised a rebellion, which fizzled when he failed to take Fort Cumberland near modern day Sackville NB. The leaders of the revolt went to the United States and petitioned Congress for a consolation prize, which they got in the form of land in Pennsylvania. I've been told, second hand, that it still isn't exactly polite conversation to bring up the topic of the rebellion with Nova Scotian families that were involved, like the Eddys, but that may just be legend. There is a local historian with some topical articles here, in particular this one. I particularly like this sneering sum-up: Sir George Collier, the senior navel commander at that station, said it was an "imbecile attempt of an inconsiderable number of New England banditti."
Confederation? Yes, Nova Scotia, more than Québec or Newfoundland, can legitimately claim to have been railroaded into confederation in a grossly improper manner against the clearly expressed democratic will of its citizens; federally and provincially, feeling was vehemently against the scheme and Tupper forced us into it with his lame-duck government. And of course, retrospectively, the anticonfederates' fears did turn out to be prescient; it was not a very good deal for Nova Scotia. Our great orator Joe Howe made his peace with it, and the MacDonald cabinet, however, and even, in a twist of irony, gets counted as a father of confederation. Still, I think most people are glad he got behind the concept of Canada rather than remain a footnote of anticonfederate history like his lesser colleague Annand.
Upon reflection, I regret rambling on about unrelated topics. Anyone still wishing to discuss the very troubling and important situation in Somalia, please ignore my digression.
Ditto, Jason, we should probably be having this discussion elsewhere.